Matoumba v. State, No. 47, September Term, 2005,
filed January 12, 2006 (opinion by Raker, J.).
Matoumba was riding in the back seat of his friend’s
car when it was pulled over for excessive speed. Because of his
observations of Matoumba, a police officer ordered him out of the car and
frisked him. The frisk produced a handgun. Before trial, a hearing was
held on a Motion to Suppress. At that hearing, neither officer was
qualified as an expert witness on the basis for reasonable articulable
suspicion to undertake a Terry frisk. The motion was denied and
Matoumba was convicted of possessing a handgun after having previously
being convicted of a crime of violence. The Court of Special Appeals
affirmed and the Court of Appeals then granted cert to review the issue
which had been raised at the suppression hearing.
The Court of Appeals decided that nothing in Terry
or Maryland law requires that a police officer be qualified as an expert
before giving his opinion on reasonable articulable suspicion to justify a
Terry frisk. This was based on a reading of the Maryland Rules of
Evidence. Before the adoption of these rules, evidentiary rules were not
strictly applied in suppressing hearings. Rule 5-101 states that the new
rules do not apply to any court proceeding which, prior to the adoption of
the rules, was not conducted under common law rule of evidence. This
included suppressing hearings.
Additionally, the Court noted that trial courts have
broad discretion under Rule 5-101(c)(1) to decide not to apply the Rules
of Evidence when determining questions of fact preliminary to
admissibility of evidence when Rule 5-104(a) is to be applied. Suppression
hearings involve the determination of preliminary questions of fact about
the admissibility of evidence and, thus, trial courts are not under an
obligation to apply the Rules of Evidence.
The Court also did not accept Matoumba’s argument
that the police were incompetent to testify under Rule 5-104(a) because
they had not been qualified as experts. According to the Court,
"competency" in Rule 5-104(a) refers only to the traditional
notion of competency (whether a witness has sufficient mental capabilities
to understand what an oath is and sufficient mind and memory to report
what he or she has seen) and not whether a witness has special knowledge
to be recognized as an expert in a particular matter.
Skidmore v. State, No. 1733, Sept Term, 2004, filed
December 2, 2005 (opinion by Meredith, J.).
Charged with vehicular manslaughter, Skidmore testified
at trial that, on the day of the accident, he had reported to work at 7:00
a.m. He later dismissed his crew, went to lunch, and then began driving
home. During his drive, he felt drowsy and realized he should not be
driving. He pulled over at a park and ride and began to nap. He was,
however, wakened by a telephone call from one of his fellow workers. He
testified that he again noticed he was "nodding off behind the
wheel" but believed he would be all right because he was close to
home. When he was about seven miles from home, as witnesses testified, his
vehicle began swerving, crossed the center line into oncoming traffic, and
struck another vehicle head on. Skidmore added that it was at that point
that he had fallen asleep and the fatal collision occurred. After being
convicted of vehicular manslaughter, Skidmore appealed, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. COSA affirmed.
Criminal Law Article 2 - 209
makes
it a crime to cause a death by driving a vehicle in a "grossly
negligent matter." Gross negligence has been defined as a wanton or
reckless disregard for human life. It can be proven by evidence that there
was such a lack of control that there was a constant potential for fatal
injury. Evidence that a driver continued to drive in conscious disregard
of the warning signs of his falling asleep at the wheel was enough to
support the trial court’s conclusion that he was operating in a grossly
negligent manner.
Skidmore had testified that he not only dozed off at
the wheel, but that he also realized that he was extremely drowsy. He
still made a deliberate decision to ignore the risk of falling asleep as
he continued driving. Such evidence of deliberate conduct was enough to
permit a finder of fact to conclude that he acted in a grossly negligent
manner.
State v. Harding, No. 637, September Term, 2005,
filed December 7, 2005 (opinion by Meredith, J.).
Harding was stopped for speeding and the stopping
officer detected a strong odor of burnt marijuana emanating from his
truck. Because of this odor, the officer searched the vehicle, even prying
off the cover of the air bag compartment on the passenger side. The
officer found a pistol, a bag of marijuana, and a partially smoked
marijuana cigarette. Harding was arrested and charged with CDS possession
and a handgun violation. Harding moved to suppress the evidence, claiming
that there was no probable cause to open the air bag compartment. The
trial court motions judge agreed with him and granted the motion to
suppress the evidence. The State appealed.
COSA reversed the trial court’s suppression decision. The traffic
stop was justified by the speeding. When the police officer smelled the
strong odor of marijuana coming from inside the vehicle, he had probable
cause to search the vehicle, including any hidden compartments. When the
officer discovered the gun and the CDS hidden in the air bag compartment,
there was probable cause to arrest Harding and to tow the vehicle to the
police station to continue a search which led to the discovery of more CDS
hidden in the spare tire. According to COSA, Harding’s motion to
suppress should have been denied.